Quantum Risk Is a 2026 Problem, Not a 2030 One

Deloitte India’s Ashish Sharma urges CISOs to begin post-quantum migration now, since replacing core cryptographic infrastructure takes five to ten years.

The quantum clock is ticking, and the deadline that matters isn’t the day a machine breaks today’s encryption. It is the day your migration should have started. According to Ashish Sharma, Partner at Deloitte India, large-scale transitions across PKI, HSMs and payment systems can take five to ten years, while adversaries are already harvesting encrypted data to decrypt later. With NIST setting 2030 and 2035 milestones and Indian regulators preparing sector-specific mandates, Sharma argues that waiting is the costliest option. In this conversation with CISO Forum, he explains where enterprises should begin, why crypto-agility is the real test of readiness, where India’s gaps lie, and what CISOs should ask their boards in five minutes.

Ashish Sharma, Partner, Deloitte India

CISO Forum: Quantum computers capable of breaking today’s encryption are still some way off. Why should a CISO treat this as a 2026 problem rather than a 2030 one?

Ashish Sharma: The challenge is not when quantum computers arrive, but how long migration takes. Mosca’s rule states that if the time your data needs to remain secure, plus the time required to migrate, exceeds the time left before quantum computers can break current encryption, you are already behind. Large-scale migrations such as PKI, HSMs and payment systems typically take 5 to 10 years.

The timelines are becoming clearer. NIST plans to phase out RSA and ECC after 2030 and stop their use after 2035. Since replacing PKIs, HSMs, and embedded systems takes years, organisations need to start planning today rather than waiting for quantum computers to arrive.

At the same time, the estimates keep changing. In 2025, Google suggested that breaking RSA-2048 may require fewer than one million qubits, highlighting how quickly assumptions around quantum capabilities are evolving.

Therefore, CISOs should treat this as a 2026 problem and act now.

CISO Forum: How real is the threat that adversaries will steal encrypted data today to decrypt it once quantum capabilities mature? Which kinds of data are most at risk?

Ashish Sharma: The adversarial threat remains very real. CERT-In, CSIRT-Fin and the SISA Digital Threat Report 2025–26 indicate that harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) strategies are already being used. Nation-states are collecting large volumes of encrypted traffic today, while the cost of storing that data continues to fall.

The most at-risk data is information that needs to remain confidential for more than 10 years. This includes government and defence communications, health records, biometrics such as Aadhaar-linked data, intellectual property and R&D, M&A documents, long-term financial and customer KYC records, as well as key exchange material used in VPN and TLS traffic.

There is also a related risk often described as “trust now, forge later.” Once quantum computers become available, attackers could forge long-term digital signatures used in firmware, root certificates, and legal documents. This makes quantum resilience particularly important for OT environments and code-signing.

CISO Forum: Most organisations don’t know where cryptography sits in their environment. Where should leaders begin when assessing their exposure and dependencies?

Ashish Sharma: Organisations should start with their most important business data and determine how long it needs to remain confidential, rather than beginning with algorithms. The first step is to map the flow of critical data across the organisation, then identify the cryptographic controls that protect it.

Leaders should prioritise assessing their PKI and certificate authorities, HSMs and key management systems, TLS and VPN endpoints, identity and SSO platforms, and code and firmware-signing infrastructure. If a foundational cryptographic component is vulnerable, everything that depends on it could be exposed.

It is also important to engage with your technology vendors now. Organisations should incorporate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) roadmap discussions into contract renewals and RFPs, as much of their cryptographic infrastructure resides in products and platforms they do not directly control.

CISO Forum: Building a cryptographic inventory sounds simple, but it rarely is. What are the biggest hurdles, from hardcoded algorithms to third-party and embedded dependencies?

Ashish Sharma: Building a cryptographic inventory may sound simple, but in practice it is challenging because cryptography is designed to remain hidden. It is often hardcoded into source code, buried in libraries such as OpenSSL and Bouncy Castle, set in configuration files, or built into firmware. Traditional network scans can only detect what is visible on the network. Third-party and SaaS dependencies are also hard to see. Organisations cannot scan inside their vendors’ environments, making it difficult to understand the cryptographic controls being used. This is why organisations should increasingly seek a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) from vendors, similar to the way Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) are used today.

Another common challenge is treating the inventory as a one-time exercise. Inventories can become outdated very quickly. Organisations should therefore rely on automated discovery across code, networks, endpoints and certificates, assign clear ownership, and maintain cryptographic assets as part of their CMDB. They should keep the inventory current.

CISO Forum: Given your work in OT security, how do you migrate legacy systems and long-lifecycle infrastructure that can’t easily be patched or swapped out?
Ashish Sharma: The starting point is to protect what you cannot replace. Organisations can use PQC-capable gateways, VPNs and network segmentation to secure traffic around legacy PLCs and RTUs that cannot be easily patched or replaced.

Prioritisation should be based on asset life cycles. Something installed today could still be running in 2045, which is why every new OT purchase should include requirements for PQC readiness or crypto-agility from the outset.

It is also important to address firmware and code-signing risks early. A fake firmware update can create long-term security risks.

CISO Forum: How prepared are India’s financial services and critical infrastructure compared with global peers? Where are the gaps most visible?

Ashish Sharma: India’s policy direction is increasingly aligned with global developments. The DST’s National Quantum Mission task force has set a goal for formal PQC implementation across critical sectors by 2027. The RBI has also established a task force for quantum-safe migration. Large banks, payment companies and telecom firms are generally further ahead in their preparedness efforts.

The main gaps remain among co-operative and regional banks, NBFCs, power distribution utilities, and OT-heavy CII, many of which rely on legacy systems and have limited expertise in cryptography. Supply-chain risks also remain a concern, as India continues to rely on imported HSMs and network equipment, even as its national testing ecosystem is still being developed. Although the US, UK and EU have more clearly defined migration milestones, India’s roadmap will require stronger regulatory mandates across sectors to drive adoption at scale.

CISO Forum: How are the regulatory and industry conversations on post-quantum cryptography shaping up, from NIST standards to Indian regulators? What should enterprises expect next?

Ashish Sharma: The regulatory and industry conversation is now moving from awareness to implementation. On the global front, NIST finalised FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), 204 (ML-DSA) and 205 (SLH-DSA) in August 2024. HQC was also selected in March 2025 as a code-based backup to ML-KEM. In parallel, regulators and agencies such as the UK NCSC and the EU have defined migration milestones, including targets for critical systems by 2030.

In India, expect sector-specific guidance and circulars from regulators such as RBI, SEBI, IRDAI, and CERC, requiring organisations to maintain an inventory and migration plan, address PQC questions in supervisory audits, and comply with procurement clauses.

CISO Forum: Why is crypto-agility, the ability to swap algorithms without rebuilding systems, becoming the real test of readiness? How do organisations build it into architecture?

Ashish Sharma: Crypto-agility is becoming the real test of readiness because PQC algorithms are still new, and some may not stand the test of time. For example, SIKE, which was once a finalist, was broken on a laptop in 2022. As a result, migration to PQC will not be a one-time event, and organisations should expect to update the same more than once. Crypto-agility will make future migrations affordable.

To build crypto-agility into the architecture, organisations should ensure that cryptography is handled through central services or APIs rather than being hardcoded into individual applications. Algorithms should be configurable through policies instead of code, while keys and certificates should be managed centrally.

During the transition, organisations should also adopt hybrid approaches that combine classical and PQC algorithms. At the same time, they should test the impact of larger key and signature sizes on latency and packet sizes, especially for OT devices with limited resources.

CISO Forum: What does a practical, phased quantum readiness roadmap look like for an enterprise starting from zero? What should be done in the next 12 months?

Ashish Sharma: Over the next 12 months, organisations should assign a responsible owner and establish a cross-functional team to drive the program. The initial focus should be on discovery and building a CBOM for the most critical systems. PQC and crypto-agility requirements should be incorporated into all new purchases, and hybrid PQC TLS should be tested on one external-facing service. Most modern browsers and CDNs already support hybrid ML-KEM.

Over the next two to three years, organisations should focus on migrating PKIs, HSMs, VPNs, and code signing. High-value and long-term data flows should then be prioritised, while legacy systems should be remediated or protected as required.

Over years three to five and beyond, organisations should complete the remaining migrations, including OT systems. RSA and ECC should be retired in line with the 2030 and 2035 deadlines, while agility and inventory management should become ongoing operational capabilities.

CISO Forum: If a CISO has five minutes with the board on quantum risk, what should they say, and what budget or decision should they ask for?

Ashish Sharma: If a CISO has five minutes with the board, the message should be simple: data that adversaries steal today could be decrypted in the 2030s. Fixing this risk across the organisation’s technology landscape could take 5 to 10 years. Regulators and NIST have already set the deadlines for the same, and delaying action will only increase future costs and complexity.

The discussion should then be linked to the organisation’s specific data assets, particularly information that needs to remain confidential for more than 10 years, as well as emerging requirements from regulators such as RBI, SEBI and CERT-In.

The immediate ask should be approval for a discovery and roadmap phase, typically backed by a 12-month budget. The board should also appoint an executive owner for the program, mandate PQC readiness in all new purchases starting now and require an annual board-level progress report.